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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - HEARSAY EVIDENCE - UNCORROB-
ORATED HEARSAY EVIDENCE WILL NOT SUPPORT A FACTUAL
FINDING IN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS.
Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v.
Ceja, 493 Pa. 588, 427 A.2d 631 (1981).
In Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Re-
view v. Ceja, I the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held2 that uncorrob-
orated hearsay3 evidence will not support a finding of an employee's
willful misconduct.4 The court divided5 on the validity of the ex-
isting standard for evaluating hearsay in unemployment compensa-
tion proceedings. Announcing the judgment of the court, Justice
Kauffman espoused new guidelines for evaluating the competency
and trustworthiness of hearsay evidence.6 As a necessary adjunct to
administering these guidelines, Justice Kauffman determined that an
uncounseled claimant must be advised of his right to have an attor-
ney, to offer witnesses, and to cross-examine adverse witnesses."
1. 493 Pa. 588, 427 A.2d 631 (1981).
2. Justice Kauffman filed an opinion in which Justices O'Brien and Nix concurred in
the result. Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Larsen and Flaherty
joined. Justice Flaherty also filed a separate concurring opinion. Chief Justice Eagen did not
participate in the decision.
3. Professor McCormick defines hearsay evidence as "testimony in court, or written evi-
dence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the
truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-
of-court asserter." C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 246, at 584 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as C. MCCORMICK].
4. See infra notes 13 and 15.
5. Justices Nix and O'Brien concurred only in the result indicating that they rejected
Justice Kauffman's reasoning and conclusions of law. Justice Roberts' concurring opinion, in
which Justices Flaherty and Larsen joined, expressly rejected Justice Kauffman's analysis.
Justice Flaherty's separate concurring opinion also declined to adopt Justice Kauffman's anal-
ysis. See infra note 18.
6. Justice Kauffman adopted a novel evaluation of hearsay evidence in unemployment
compensation cases. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
7. 493 Pa. at 611, 427 A.2d at 643. Justice Kauffman expressly overruled prior Com-
monwealth Court decisions which hold that claimants need not be advised of their due process
rights. Id (citing Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Tumolo, 25 Pa. Commw.
264, 360 A.2d 763 (1976) and Paoloco v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 10 Pa. Commw. 214, 309 A.2d 594 (1973)). See, e.g., Schultz v. Common-
wealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 48 Pa. Commw. 36, 408 A.2d 1177
(1979) (referee's failure to advise claimant of his right to counsel did not deny claimant due
process); Bracy v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 34 Pa.
Commw. 173, 382 A.2d 1295 (1978) (referee's failure to inform claimant that he could object to
testimony did not affect fundamental fairness of hearing); Knox v. Commonwealth Unemploy-
ment Compensation Board of Review, 12 Pa. Commw. 588, 317 A.2d 60 (1974) (referee's fail-
ure to counsel unrepresented claimant on how to prove his case did not deny claimant due
process). See infra note 56.
* On January 4, 1977, the Commonwealth Department of Reve-
nue dismissed claimant, Theresa J. Ceja, from her job as a calculat-
ing operator.8 Thereafter, the Bureau of Employment Security
determined claimant ineligible for unemployment compensation
benefits. After a hearing before a referee on appeal, she was again
denied benefits.'
At the hearing, the employer offered documentary evidence of
claimant's past misconduct. The evidence included two notices of
suspension and several reports of disciplinary proceedings.' 0 In ad-
dition, the employer presented written inter-office communications
to show that claimant had called her supervisor an "S.O.B." and had
created a disturbance in her work area. This incident led directly to
claimant's dismissal. The employer's evidence of the incident in-
cluded a memorandum, based on information supplied by others,
written by the Chief of the Taxing and Resettlement Division to the
Director of the Bureau of Corporation Taxes describing claimant's
conduct.'" The referee also admitted two eyewitness accounts of
claimant's behavior that were written at the request of the Bureau's
Assistant Director.
The uncounseled claimant never formally objected to the intro-
duction of the employer's evidence, although she denied the reasons
for suspension given'in the notices and characterized the memoranda
as "inaccurate" and "twisted."1 2 A representative of the employer
read the documents into the record. The employer called no wit-
nesses who had personal knowledge of either the disputed events or
the manner in which the reports had been prepared.
The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review affirmed
the referee's denial of benefits. The Board found that claimant's
proper discharge for willful misconduct precluded her from receiv-
ing compensation under the Unemployment Compensation Law.'"
8. The Department of Revenue had employed Ceja for ten years.
9. The Bureau of Employment Security and the referee determined that claimant's dis-
charge for willful misconduct precluded her from receiving benefits. See infra note 13.
10. The Department of Revenue's case consisted of thirteen memoranda, including eight
reports of incidents involving the claimant's alleged misconduct and summaries of the discipli-
nary proceedings that followed. Ceja v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board
of Review, 41 Pa. Commw. 487, 488 n.I, 399 A.2d 807, 808 n.1 (1979).
II. Upon receiving the letter describing the incidents of claimant's misconduct, the Di-
rector of Corporation Taxes wrote to the Assistant to the Secretary of Revenue and recom-
mended claimant's dismissal. 493 Pa. at 592, 427 A.2d at 633.
12. Id Claimant denied using abusive or profane language, or engaging in disruptive
conduct on the day of the alleged incident. Ceja v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compen-
sation Board of Review, 41 Pa. Commw. at 489 n.3, 399 A.2d at 808 n.3.
13. The Unemployment Compensation Law provides in pertinent part that "[a]n em-
ployee shall be ineligible for compensation for any week . . . [iun which his unemployment is
due to his discharge or temporary suspension from work for willful misconduct connected with
his work." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(e) (Purdon 1964).
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, in Kentucky Fried Chicken of Altoona, Inc. v.
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed,' 4 holding that the
employer had failed to meet its burden of proving willful misconduct
because the evidence offered at the hearing consisted of uncorrobo-
rated hearsay.' 5 The court relied on Walker v. Unemployment Com-
pensation Board of Review, 16 which held that hearsay admitted
without objection cannot support a factual finding unless corrobo-
rated by competent evidence.' 7 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
granted allocatur to consider the propriety of the Walker guide-
lines 8 and affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court.' 9
Traditionally, the strict rules of evidence applicable in jury tri-
als have not bound administrative agencies.20 The examiner may
hear and consider all testimony, including hearsay, offered at an ad-
ministrative hearing.2' Nevertheless, the hearing officer must make
findings of fact supported by substantial evidence in the record.22
These conflicting principles led to the development of the legal resid-
uum rule, which requires that some of the evidence supporting an
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 10 Pa. Commw. 90, 309 A.2d 165 (1973),
defined willful misconduct as
(1) the wanton and wilful disregard of the employer's interest, (2) the deliberate vio-
lation of rules, (3) the disregard of standards of behavior which an employer can
rightfully expect from his employee, or (4) negligence which manifests culpability,
wrongful intent, evil design, or intentional and substantial disregard for the em-
ployer's interests or the employee's duties and obligations.
Id. at 97, 309 A.2d at 168-69. See infra note 15.
14. Ceja v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 41 Pa.
Commw. 487, 399 A.2d 807 (1979). The court initially determined that the Department of
Revenue's documentary evidence fell outside the statutory hearsay exception provided by the
Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 91b (Purdon 1958). See
infra note 40.
15. 41 Pa. Commw. at 490, 399 A.2d at 809. The employer assumes the burden of prov-
ing willful misconduct. McLean v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 476 Pa.
617, 383 A.2d 533 (1978); Philadelphia Geriatric Center v. Commonwealth Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 46 Pa. Commw. 357, 406 A.2d 1177 (1979).
16. 27 Pa. Commw. 522, 367 A.2d 366 (1976).
17. Id at 527, 367 A.2d at 370.
18. The Justices could not agree on the appropriate standard of review for hearsay in
unemployment compensation proceedings. Although Justice Kauffman discredited the guide-
lines set forth in Walker, Justice Roberts' concurring opinion stated that "any modification of
our rules against hearsay should be made cautiously, if at all. In the absence of any error
below, this case most certainly does not provide the proper vehicle for modification, nor does
the opinion of Mr. Justice Kauffman provide the proper direction." 493 Pa. at 618, 427 A.2d at
647.
19. Id at 614, 427 A.2d at 644.
20. See McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., 261 Pa. 312, 104 A. 617 (1918); 1 F. COOPER,
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 379-80 (1965) [hereinafter cited as F. COOPER]; 3 K. DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.4 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as K. DAVIS]; C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 3, §§ 348-49; 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 4a (3d
ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as J. WIGMORE]; Collins, Hearsay in the Administrative Process.: A
Review and Reconsideration of the State of the Law c/Certain Evidentiary Procedures Applicable
in California Administrative Proceedings, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 577, 589-90 (1976).
21. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 350.
22. See I F. COOPER, supra note 20, at 404-05; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 352.
Judicial review of administrative findings of fact is restricted to whether substantial evidence
supports such findings, "leaving to the Board questions of credibility and giving to the party
prevailing below the benefit of all reasonable and logical inferences." Rice v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 19 Pa. Commw. 592, 594, 338 A.2d 792, 794 (1975).
administrative finding be admissible in a jury trial situation.23
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania first adopted the legal re-
siduum rule in McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co. 24 While recogniz-
ing that technical rules of evidence do not bind the Workmen's
Compensation Board and the referee, the McCauley court held that
"when all the irrelevant and incompetent testimony has been put
aside, the findings must rest upon such relevant and competent evi-
dence of sound, probative character as may be left, be this either
circumstantial or direct."25 Language of the United States Supreme
Court in Consolidated Edison v. NLRB 26 supports the legal residuum
rule. The Court defined substantial evidence as "such relevant evi-
dence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion,"27 but went on to state that "[m]ere uncorroborated
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. '"28
Many critical authorities label the legal residuum rule a mere
technicality that prevents the examiner from weighing the reliability
and probative worth of potentially trustworthy hearsay evidence.29
Consequently, a few states have abandoned the rule3" and the fed-
eral courts have restricted the rule's application.3' Nonetheless, a
majority of states that have considered the question continue to sup-
port the legal residuum rule.32
As applied to hearsay evidence in Pennsylvania unemployment
compensation cases, the legal residuum rule resulted in a conflicting
standard of appellate review. As the general rule, hearsay evidence,
23. The legal residuum rule originated in a New York workmen's compensation case,
Carrol v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916). Professor Cooper has
noted: "Under [the legal residuum] rule, it is said that a finding cannot be deemed to be
supported by substantial evidence unless at least a residuum of the supporting evidence would
be competent under the exclusionary rules. For example, if the supporting evidence were all
hearsay, it could not be deemed substantial." I F. COOPER, supra note 20, at 405.
24. 261 Pa. 312, 104 A. 617 (1918).
25. Id at 326, 104 A. at 622.
26. 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
27. Id at 229.
28. Id at 230.
29. See, e.g., 3 K. DAvis, supra note 20, § 16:6; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, §§ 350-51;
I J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 4b; K. DAVIS, Hearsay in Administratipe Hearings, 32 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 689 (1964). But see, e.g., I F. COOPER, supra note 20, at 391-93, 411; B.
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 114-121 (1976).
30. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 98 Ariz. 97, 402 P.2d 414 (1965)
(hearsay alone may support award in workmen's compensation case if in all the circumstances
it sufficiently satisfies the reasonable mind); C.T.S. Corp. v. Schoulton, 354 N.E.2d 324 (Ind.
App. 1976) (hearsay may provide basis of decision in workmen's compensation proceeding if
trustworthy and credible); Redding v. Board of County Comm'rs, 263 Md. 94, 282 A.2d 136
(1971) (hearsay may provide sole basis of administrative decision if credible and of sufficient
probative value).
31. E.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145 (9th
Cir. 1980). See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
32. I F. COOPER, supra note 20, at 406-410; B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 117
(1976). For a collection of cases concerning hearsay evidence in state administrative proceed-
ings, see Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 12 (1971).
properly objected to, could not support a factual finding.33 Con-
versely, administrative bodies accorded hearsay admitted without
objection its natural probative effect. In some cases, therefore, hear-
say admitted without objection was found sufficient to support a de-
cision.34 The Commonwealth Court corrected this inconsistency in
Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review" by estab-
lishing guidelines for evaluating hearsay evidence. The court held
that hearsay, properly objected to, cannot competently support a
finding of an administrative board, but hearsay admitted without ob-
jection will be given its natural probative effect and may support a
finding if corroborated by any competent evidence in the record.36
Walker, in effect, restates the traditional legal residuum rule and has
been followed in the majority of unemployment compensation cases
decided since its adoption.37 Walker remains the accepted standard
of review, despite Justice Kauffman's reasoning in Ceja.38
In Cea, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court initially determined
that the evidence introduced by the employer 9 at the unemployment
compensation hearing did not fall within the existing statutory hear-
say exception for business records.' Furthermore, because the evi-
33. Eg., Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Cooper, 25 Pa. Commw.
256, 360 A.2d 293 (1976); Bickling v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 17 Pa. Commw. 619, 333 A.2d 519 (1975).
34. E.g., Owen v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 26 Pa. Commw. 278,
363 A.2d 852 (1976); Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Stiles, 19 Pa.
Commw. 38, 340 A.2d 594 (1975); Covell v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 16 Pa. Commw. 637, 330 A.2d 319 (1975); Pelligrino v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 8 Pa. Commw. 486, 303 A.2d 875 (1973).
35. 27 Pa. Commw. 522, 367 A.2d 366 (1976).
36. Id at 527, 367 A.2d at 370.
37. See, e.g., Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensa-
tion Board of Review, 55 Pa. Commw. 517, 423 A.2d 798 (1980); Maxwell v. Commonwealth
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 54 Pa. Commw. 604, 423 A.2d 430 (1980);
Lee v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 52 Pa. Commw. 171,
415 A.2d 456 (1980); Bracy v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Re-
view, 34 Pa. Commw. 173, 382 A.2d 1295 (1978).
38. In Legare v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, - Pa.
-, 444 A.2d 1151 (1982), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that uncorroborated hearsay
evidence is not competent to support a factual finding of the Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review. Justice Larsen's majority opinion cited Walker and the concurring opinions
in Ceja as support for this holding. In Fritzo v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensa-
tion Board of Review, 59 Pa. Commw. 268, 429 A.2d 1215 (1981), the Commonwealth Court
refused to adopt the reasoning that Justice Kauffman employed in Ceja. The Fritzo court
reiterated the Walker rule and continued to state the following:
[T]his rule regarding unobjected to but corroborated hearsay evidence was evaluated
and found wanting by one Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, but, since
two other Justices only concurred in the result reached in that case and three other
Justices disagreed with the analysis of the single Justice, we do not understand the
rule to be overruled.
Id at 274, 429 A.2d at 1218-19.
39. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
40. At the time of the hearing, the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act provided,
in pertinent part, the following:
A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evi-
dence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode
of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business at or near the
dence consisted of uncorroborated hearsay, the court found that the
employer had failed to prove willful misconduct4 and, thus, claim-
ant was not barred from receiving benefits.
The Justices concurred only in the result reached in Ceja. The
court's lack of unity42 resulted from conflicting views on which evi-
dentiary standard should be utilized for evaluating hearsay evidence
in administrative proceedings.
Announcing the judgment of the court, Justice Kauffman pre-
scribed a new standard whereby any evidence, if relevant and relia-
ble, may support a factual finding.43 Under Justice Kauffman's
scheme, hearsay evidence will be deemed competent if it meets two
requirements. First, the hearsay must fall within a recognized excep-
tion to the hearsay rule or exhibit equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness. Second, the evidence must be relevant and
have sufficient probative worth."
Justice Kauffman discredited the legal residuum rule as set forth
in McCauley,45 referring to criticisms leveled against the rule by nu-
merous legal scholars.46 Justice Kauffman pointed out that in fact,
the rule operates to create a more demanding evidentiary standard
for administrative hearings than for jury trials. This anomaly results
because hearsay, unobjected to, cannot support a factual finding in
an administrative hearing, but can stand alone in support of a ver-
time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of
information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 91b (Purdon 1958) (The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act
was subsequently repealed in 1978 and reenacted as 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(b) (Pur-
don 1981)). In Ceja, the court held that the employer's documents did not meet the criteria set
forth in the Act because no attempt was made to establish the employer's representative as the
custodian of the documents or the custodian's qualifications to testify concerning their mode of
preparation, nor was an attempt made to demonstrate someone prepared the documents in the
regular course of business. 492 Pa. at 592-93, 427 A.2d at 633-34.
41. See supra notes 13 and 15.
42. See supra notes 2 and 5.
43. 493 Pa. at 610-12, 427 A.2d at 642-44.
44. Justice Kauffman provided the following guidelines:
1. Hearsay evidence is generally admissible.
2. Hearsay evidence will be accepted as competent if it falls within the statutory or
common law exceptions to the hearsay rule, or has equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness and is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent could reasonably be ex-
pected to procure under the circumstances of the case.
3. The hearsay proponent carries the burden of making a prima facie showing of
competence before the evidence can be used to support a finding.
Id at 611, 427 A.2d at 643.
45. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
46. 493 Pa. at 594-601, 427 A.2d at 634-37. See I R. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJU-
DICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 174-75 (1942); 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 14.10 (1958 & Supp. 1970); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, §§ 350-52; 1 J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 20, § 4b. Justice Kauffman cited Judge Learned Hand for the proposition
that hearsay may support a decision if reasonable persons would rely on that type of evidence
in conducting serious business matters. Eg., United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 677-79
(2d Cir. 1955).
dict in a jury trial.47 The opinion maintains that a better standard of
review would allow the administrator to measure "the quantity and
quality of the supporting evidence regardless of its category or la-
bel."48 Similarly, Justice Kauffman rejected the Walker4 9 guidelines
because he felt that they preserved an "artificial" distinction between
objected to and unobjected to hearsay evidence which fails to ade-
quately test the competency of the evidence. 50
In spite of severe criticism, the legal residuum rule has operated
to protect the rights of litigants by requiring agencies to carefully
scrutinize evidence presented in contested cases.5 The concern in
jurisdictions that continue to apply the rule is that broad admission
of hearsay evidence may hamper "the discovery of the truth and
may even serve as an invitation to perjury."52 Justice Flaherty ar-
ticulated this concern in his concurring opinion. Although he recog-
nized merit in allowing the administrator to test hearsay evidence for
reliability, Justice Flaherty stated that Justice Kauffman's lenient po-
sition could result in findings based upon "rank" hearsay.53
Justice Kauffman reasoned that the exclusionary rules of evi-
dence function to protect the jury from hearing untrustworthy evi-
dence and, therefore, do not apply in the administrative setting.
5 4
Indeed, the Administrative Agency Law in Pennsylvania frees agen-
cies from the duty to observe strict rules of evidence by declaring
admissible all relevant evidence of reasonable probative value.55
Nonetheless, due process considerations require protection of the lit-
igants' right to a fair and impartial hearing,56 and the unrestricted
47. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 352.
48. 493 Pa. at 598-99, 427 A.2d at 636.
49. See supra notes 35, 36 and accompanying text (quoting C. MCCORMICK, supra note
3, § 352 at 848).
50. - Pa. at -, 427 A.2d at 638.
51. 1 F. COOPER, supra note 20, at 411. All administrative agency hearings must afford
due process of law. Brookwood Farms v. Milk Marketing Bd., 8 Pa. Commw. 511, 304 A.2d
510 (1973). In Ceja, the due process rights of the parties particularly concerned Justice Rob-
erts because the admission of hearsay denies the right to cross-examine and confront adverse
witnesses. 493 Pa. at 618, 427 A.2d at 647.
52. 1 F. COOPER, supra note 20, at 393.
53. 493 Pa. at 619, 427 A.2d at 647. Justice Flaherty observed that "[f]undamental due
process requires that no adjudication be based solely upon hearsay evidence. This tenet of our
law is not a 'technicality,' but rather lies at the root of the truth determining process." Id
54. Id at 619, 427 A.2d at 634., See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
55. The Administrative Agency Law provides that "agencies shall not be bound by tech-
nical rules of evidence at agency hearings, and all relevant evidence of reasonably probative
value may be received. Reasonable examination and cross examination shall be permitted." 2
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505 (Purdon Supp. 1964-1980). (This section is substantially a reen-
actment of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.32 (Purdon 1962)). At the time of the hearing in
Ceja, this section appeared at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.32 (Purdon 1962).)
56. Claimant must show specific deprivations of the rights to counsel, to offer witnesses,
or to cross-examine witnesses in order to prove a violation of his due process rights. Alterna-
tively, claimant must demonstrate "an unfairness permeating the hearing so as to strike at the
conscience." Knox v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 12 Pa.
Commw. 588, 592, 317 A.2d 60, 63 (1974). See also Quality Bakery v. Unemployment Com-
pensation Board of Review, 194 Pa. Super. 79, 166 A.2d 303 (1960). Where these due process
admission of hearsay evidence denies the party against whom the
evidence is admitted the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
57
Justice Kauffman resolved this conflict by stating that a party
has a "reasonable opportunity"58 to challenge the reliability of ad-
verse hearsay through the referee's authority to subpoena the hear-
say proponent upon a determination that further investigation is
required. Justice Kauffman indicated that this safeguard both pro-
tects a litigant's due process rights and serves "the governmental in-
terest in summary adjudications."59 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Roberts disagreed with Justice Kauffman's formulation. Justice
Roberts stressed the importance of claimant's due process rights re-
garding admissibility of hearsay evidence in an administrative hear-
ing, because the hearing will often determine the claimant's "liveli-
hood," a fundamental property right.6"
To support his conclusion that tribunals should no longer apply
the residuum rule in administrative hearings, Justice Kauffman cited
the Federal Rules of Evidence.6' The Federal Rules prohibit the use
of hearsay unless it falls within a statutory exception.62 The
''residual" hearsay exception admits hearsay statements not covered
by other specific exceptions upon certain determinations by the
court, provided the statement has "equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness. '63 Justice Kauffman gives the Rules consid-
erable weight as indicated by his adoption of the specific "residual
exception" language in framing his guidelines for the evaluation of
hearsay evidence.64
In addition, Justice Kauffman cited a United States Supreme
rights have been denied, the Commonwealth Court has remanded or reversed. Kentucky
Fried Chicken of Altoona, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 10 Pa.
Commw. 90, 309 A.2d 165 (1973); Cerceo v. Borough of Darby, 3 Pa. Commw. 174, 281 A.2d
251 (1971). See infra notes 74, 75 and accompanying text.
57. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 351.
58. 493 Pa. at 609-10, 427 A.2d at 642. Justice Kauffman noted that the "reasonable
opportunity" determination hinges upon a balancing of interests test similar to the test adopted
by the United States Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The Court
stated that, in administrative proceedings, "[t]he extent to which procedural due process must
be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be condemned to suffer
grievous loss, and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss out-
weighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication." Id at 262-63 (citations omitted).
59. 493 Pa. at 610, 427 A.2d at 642-43.
60. Id at 617, 427 A.2d at 646.
61. FED. R. EvID. 803(24).
62. FED. R. EVID. 802.
63. FED. R. EVID. 803(24). The Federal Rules of Evidence provide for the admission of
hearsay:
if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests ofjustice will be served by admission
of the statement into evidence.
Id
64. See supra note 44.
Court decision, Richardson v. Perales,65 which has been influential in
undermining the basic tenet of the residuum rule in federal adminis-
trative proceedings.6 6 In Perales, the Court held that written physi-
cians' reports can constitute substantial evidence supporting a
finding by the hearing examiner, despite both their hearsay character
and an absence of cross-examination. However, the Court limited its
holding to those cases in which a claimant with a right to subpoena
the reporting physician has not exercised that right.
67
Justice Roberts found Justice Kauffman's reliance on Perales
misplaced because in Pennsylvania only the Board of Compensation,
and not claimant, has the right to subpoena witnesses. 68 Further-
more, Justice Roberts pointed out that requiring the claimant to call
witnesses against himself conflicts with usual procedures because the
employer in unemployment compensation cases has the burden of
proving Willful misconduct.69
Justice Kauffman warned that "fairness must be the touch-
stone"70 in the administration of his new guidelines. To further this
objective and in reliance upon the rules governing practice and pro-
cedure in unemployment compensation cases, 7' Justice Kauffman
declared that "at the very least, the referee must advise an uncoun-
seled claimant of his right to have an attorney, to offer witnesses and
to cross-examine adverse witnesses. 72 Justice Kauffman's opinion
expressly overruled prior Pennsylvania case law on this issue.7 3
However, in light of the division of the court and because the un-
counseled claimant did not allege denial of a fair and impartial hear-
ing, the determination of this issue is clearly dictum. Nonetheless,
the opinions of Justice Roberts and Justice Flaherty failed to address
this question and hence did not indicate disagreement with Justice
Kauffman's pronouncement.
65. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
66. See 3 K. DAvis, supra note 20, §§ 16:7, 16:8 and cases cited therein.
67. 402 U.S. at 402.
68. 493 Pa. at 618, 427 A.2d at 646. The Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation
Law provides that "the department and the board shall have the power to issue summons or
subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, corre-
spondence, memoranda, and other records deemed necessary as evidence in connection with a
disputed claim or the administration of this act." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 826 (Purdon 1964).
69. 493 Pa. at 618, 427 A.2d at 647. See supra note IS.
70. Id at 611,427 A.2d at 643.
71. The rules promulgated pursuant to the Unemployment Compensation Law, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 763 (Purdon 1964), provide:
a) In any hearing the tribunal may examine the parties and their witnesses. Where a
party is not represented by counsel the tribunal before whom the hearing is being
held should advise him as to his rights, aid him in examining and cross examining
witnesses, and give him every assistance compatible with the impartial discharge of
its official duties.
34 PA. CODE 101.21(a).
72. 493 Pa. at 611, 427 A.2d at 643.
73. Id at 611 n.35, 427 A.2d at 643 n.35. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
In Hoffman v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 4 the Commonwealth Court relied on Justice
Kauffman's Ceja dictum and reversed a ruling adverse to the claim-
ant because the referee did not advise the claimant of her right to
have an attorney, to offer witnesses, and to cross-examine adverse
witnesses.75 However, in other cases decided since Ceja, the Com-
monwealth Court has declined to reverse a denial of benefits absent
a showing that the referee's failure to advise claimant of his rights
resulted in prejudice to the claimant.
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In applying his guidelines to the facts in Ceja, Justice Kauffman
focused upon the unsatisfactory conduct of the referee at the hear-
ing. Specifically, Justice Kauffman found that the referee did not
protect the rights of the uncounseled claimant because he failed to
advise the claimant of her right to have an attorney, failed to provide
her with an opportunity to challenge the evidence, and interrupted
her when she tried to interject comments. 77 Thus, it appears that the
conduct of the referee influenced Justice Kauffman's decision more
than the guidelines adopted in his opinion.
Justice Kauffman maintained that his guidelines represent a
"simple common-sense" 78 analysis. Actually, he advances a confus-
ing standard. Indeed, Justice Roberts noted that applying the guide-
lines to the facts in Ceja could well have resulted in a determination
adverse to the claimant.79 Claimant did not object to the evidence
introduced by the employer at the hearing before the referee and all
the documents introduced were part of the employer's records.8"
Therefore, under Justice Kauffman's formulation, there existed
"some foundation" for the reliability of the hearsay.8"
In Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Re-
view v. Ceja, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court created unnecessary
confusion. Although the court indicated dissatisfaction with the ex-
isting hearsay evidentiary rule, the justices, unable to agree on an
employable standard, established no clear precedent. The "indicia
of reliability" test espoused by Justice Kauffman did not gain the
74. 60 Pa. Commw. 108, 430 A.2d 1036 (1981).
75. Id at -, 430 A.2d at 1037. Similarly, in Katz v. Commonwealth Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 59 Pa. Commw. 427, 430 A.2d 354 (1981), the Common-
wealth Court reversed and remanded an order of the Unemployment Compensation Appeal
Board because the claimant was not advised of her rights. Justice Kauffman's dictum in Ceja
persuaded the court to take this action.
76. Lauffer v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 61 Pa.
Commw. 519, 434 A.2d 249 (1981); Snow v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 61 Pa. Commw. 396, 433 A.2d 922 (1981); D. Robinson v. Commonwealth
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 60 Pa. Commw. 275, 431 A.2d 378 (1981).
77. 493 Pa. at 612-13, 427 A.2d at 644.
78. Id at 609, 427 A.2d at 642.
79. Id at 615, 427 A.2d at 645.
80. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
81. 493 Pa. at 611-12, 427 A.2d at 463.
support of the other justices and, therefore, the Pennsylvania courts
have declined to adopt it. 82 Conversely, lower court decisions since
Ceja have followed Justice Kauffman's dictum, which requires the
referee to advise an uncounseled claimant of his procedural rights.1
3
This occurrence should have a marked influence on subsequent pro-
cedure in unemployment compensation hearings. Significantly, the
Ceja decision evinces the court's willingness to further scrutinize the
existing hearsay evidentiary standard.84 Any modification of the le-
gal residuum rule in future decisions will likely take into account the
reliability factor in evaluating hearsay evidence.
82. Le Gare v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, - Pa.
Commw. -, 444 A.2d 1151 (1982); Fritzo v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, - Pa. Commw. -, 429 A.2d 1215 (1981). See supra note 38 and accompa-
nying text.
83. See supra notes 74, 75 and accompanying text.
84. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court continues to apply the evidentiary standard
set forth in Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 27 Pa. Commw. 522,
367 A.2d 366 (1976). See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
[Casenote by Nancy M. Armezzani]

